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TO REMEDY OR NOT TO REMEDY:  
THE AVAILABILITY OF DISGORGEMENT 
UNDER CIVIL RICO 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) is 
one of the broadest and most complex statutes in American history. RICO 
has been the object of much controversy because of its broad reach and its 
imposition of both criminal and civil penalties. The statute was enacted as 
a response to the problem of organized crime, which was particularly 
prominent at the time of its passage.1 However, over time RICO was 
increasingly used as a method of obtaining alternative relief in securities 
and business fraud cases.2 Although Congress enacted it primarily as a 
criminal statute, RICO provides for a variety of civil remedies including 
treble damages and costs and attorney’s fees.3 RICO was viewed almost 
exclusively as a criminal statute during the first ten years of its existence. 
Although enacted in 1970, the explosion of civil RICO claims did not 
begin until the 1980s.4 The attractiveness of civil RICO to plaintiffs lies 
predominantly in the prospect of treble damages.5 However, the 
availability of a federal forum and the award of mandatory costs and 
 
 
 1. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970) (“It is the purpose of this Act to seek the 
eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-
gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and 
new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.”). 
 2. See, e.g., Barbara Black, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO)—
Securities and Commercial Fraud as Racketeering Crime after Sedima: What is a “Pattern of 
Racketeering Activity?”, 6 PACE L. REV. 365, 366 (1986) (“Attorneys representing the victims of 
securities and commercial fraud now routinely add a claim alleging a RICO violation. It is the 
attractiveness of the remedy—the successful plaintiff’s recovery of treble damages and attorney’s 
fees—that has led to this ever increasing use of RICO.”). 
 3. See infra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 4. For example, of civil RICO cases decided prior to 1985, only three percent were decided 
between 1970–1980. After that time, two percent were decided in 1980, seven percent in 1981, thirteen 
percent in 1982, thirty-three percent in 1983, and forty-three percent in 1986. See ARTHUR F. 
MATHEWS ET AL., REPORT OF THE AD HOC CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE 55 (1985). 
 5. See Plount v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 668 F. Supp. 204, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“[T]he civil 
RICO has resulted in a flood of what are and should be state court cases that are being reframed and 
brought in federal court as RICO actions because of the carrot of treble recovery and the availability of 
a federal forum.”); Meadow Ltd. P’ship v. Heritage Savings & Loan Ass’n, 639 F. Supp. 643, 650 
(E.D. Va. 1986) (“Not surprisingly, given the attractiveness of RICO’s treble damages and attorneys 
fees, plaintiffs often include RICO counts in run-of-the-mill commercial cases, such as this one.”). 
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attorney’s fees are additional reasons why plaintiffs find civil RICO 
attractive.6 
The continuing use of the civil RICO statute in cases not related to 
organized crime has led some commentators to argue that civil RICO is 
not just being overused but abused by plaintiffs.7 Many business leaders 
have criticized civil RICO’s broad reach.8 Still others have argued that the 
extensive use of RICO has contributed greatly to the expansion of federal 
criminal law.9 
RICO provides for a variety of remedies under both the criminal and 
civil sections. For instance, under criminal RICO, the government may 
seek imprisonment, fines, injunctions, and even forfeiture of any of the 
 
 
 6. See, e.g., Phillip Stuller, How the RIAA Can Stop Worrying and Learn to Love the RICO Act: 
Exploiting Civil RICO to Battle Peer-to-Peer Copyright Infringement, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 521, 
526 (2004) (“There are many attractive benefits for successful civil RICO plaintiffs including treble 
damage awards, mandatory cost and attorney fee awards, nationwide service of process, [and] 
worldwide personal jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 7. See generally Michael Goldsmith & Mark Jay Linderman, Civil RICO Reform: The 
Gatekeeper Concept, 43 VAND. L. REV. 735 (1990) (discussing abuses of civil RICO); Arthur 
Mathews, Shifting the Burden of Losses in the Securities Markets: The Role of Civil RICO in Securities 
Litigation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 896, 929 (1990) (commenting that “the use of civil RICO 
[provisions has] been pushed far beyond what Congress originally envisioned.”). For a discussion on 
ways to reform RICO to eliminate abuses of the statute, see generally Michael Goldsmith, Civil RICO 
Reform: The Basis for Compromise, 71 MINN. L. REV. 827 (1987). But see Michael Goldsmith & 
Penrod W. Keith, Civil RICO Abuse: The Allegations in Context, 1986 BYU L. REV. 55 (1986) 
(arguing that RICO’s critics have overstated the abuse of the statute, current legal procedures are 
adequate for handling abuses, and RICO is an effective tool for combating fraud in the commercial 
context). 
 8. For example, Edward O’Brien, president of the Securities Industry Association, argued: 
[B]ecause of the enticement of the possibility of treble damages and the recovery of attorney 
fees, [RICO] is now a boilerplate allegation used in every imaginable type of civil action, 
particularly common ordinary commercial disputes . . . . 
The Department of Justice, in its use of RICO in criminal prosecutions, has published very 
careful guidelines for its use . . . . Unfortunately, plaintiffs’ counsel in civil RICO suits have 
no such guidelines. The use of the statute is indiscriminate . . . . 
Oversight on Civil RICO Suits: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 3–4 (1985) 
(statement of Edward O’Brien, President, Sec. Indus. Ass’n) (footnotes omitted). One Securities and 
Exchange Commission Member testified that: 
RICO charges have been made in a wide variety of . . . cases against legitimate businesses 
having nothing whatsoever to do with organized crime . . . . 
RICO’s civil liability provision has turned virtually every securities fraud claim into a 
potential RICO claim, with all the benefits that RICO confers on plaintiffs, including 
potential treble damages and attorneys’ fees and access to federal courts even for state law 
claims. 
Oversight on Civil RICO Suits: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 7 (1985) 
(statement of Charles Marinaccio, Member of the Sec. & Exch. Comm’n). 
 9. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 501–22 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(noting the dramatic shift of federal power under RICO). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss4/4











defendant’s proceeds derived from a violation of RICO.10 In addition to 
costs and attorney’s fees and treble damages, equitable relief may be 
available to civil RICO plaintiffs, but courts disagree about the availability 
of equitable relief to private plaintiffs under civil RICO.11 The breadth and 
scope of the RICO statute make the question of what remedies should be 
obtainable by civil RICO plaintiffs especially difficult. 
This Note considers whether disgorgement should be available as a 
remedy under civil RICO. Part II examines the leading cases on 
disgorgement under civil RICO and reviews the legislative history of 
RICO as it relates to the issue of available remedies. Part III discusses the 
rationale of the two leading cases in this area in light of the legislative 
history of the statute and prior Supreme Court precedent. Part IV proposes 
that disgorgement is a remedy properly within the courts’ equitable 
jurisdiction as conveyed in § 1964(a), and, therefore, should be available 
under civil RICO. 
II. OVERVIEW 
Civil RICO provides a remedy of treble damages, the cost of the suit, 
and reasonable attorney’s fees to “any person injured in his business or 
property by reason of a violation . . . .”12 Section 1964(c) expressly creates 
 
 
 10. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (2000). Few if any other criminal statutes provide for forfeiture. 
Criminal forfeiture was largely unknown in American law at the time. The use of the forfeiture 
provision was intended to provide an innovative approach to the contemporary problem of organized 
crime. See S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 79 (1969). 
 11. Compare Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 267 F.3d 687, 695 (7th Cir. 2001), rev’d 
on other grounds, Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393 (2003) (“We are persuaded 
. . . that the text of the RICO statute, understood in the proper light, itself authorizes private parties to 
seek injunctive relief.”), with Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1088 (9th Cir. 
1986) (“Taken together, the legislative history and statutory language suggest overwhelmingly that no 
private equitable action should be implied under civil RICO.”). Other courts have discussed the issue 
without deciding it. See, e.g., Johnson v. Collins Entm’t. Co., 199 F.3d 710, 726 (4th Cir. 1999); In re 
Fredeman Litig., 843 F.2d 821, 828–30 (5th Cir. 1988); Trane Co. v. O’Connor Sec., 718 F.2d 26, 28–
29 (2d Cir. 1983) (expressing doubt about availability of injunctive relief for private plaintiffs); 
Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1361, 1366 (8th Cir. 1983) (McMillan, J., concurring) (suggesting 
injunctive relief is available). 
 12. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000). This section reads: 
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this 
chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover 
threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s 
fee, except that no person may rely upon any conduct that would have been actionable as 
fraud in the purchase or sale of securities to establish a violation of section 1962. The 
exception contained in the preceding sentence does not apply to an action against any person 
that is criminally convicted in connection with the fraud, in which case the statute of 
limitations shall start to run on the date on which the conviction become final. 
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a private cause of action for individuals who suffer injury to their business 
or property. Congress intended the private cause of action to act as a 
supplement to the criminal provisions of RICO to aid in combating 
organized crime.13 The statute also grants courts the power to “prevent and 
restrain violations” by “issuing appropriate orders.”14 This provision is 
sometimes interpreted as providing equitable relief to private plaintiffs.15 
Civil RICO also provides for divestiture, restrictions on future activities, 
and dissolution or reorganization of an enterprise.16 Interestingly, RICO 
contains a liberal construction clause mandating that “the provisions of 
this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.”17 
Although most courts have followed the directive, some have applied a 
narrow construction to the statute, criticizing RICO’s ambiguous and 
overly broad nature.18 The Supreme Court has shown a willingness to 
apply RICO’s liberal construction clause to civil actions under § 1964.19 
To satisfy the elements of a civil RICO action, the plaintiff must show 
an injury to business or property caused by the defendant’s violation of 
 
 
 13. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 498 (describing the intent of those supporting § 1964(c) to improve 
the effectiveness of RICO through private action). 
 14. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (2000). The whole section reads: 
The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain 
violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders, including, but not 
limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any 
enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of any 
person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type 
of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign 
commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making due provision 
for the rights of innocent persons. 
 15. See supra note 11. 
 16. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (2000). 
 17. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922 (1970). 
Few, if any, other federal criminal statutes contain such a clause. 
 18. See Michael P. Kenny, Escaping the RICO Dragnet in Civil Litigation: Why Won’t the Lower 
Courts Listen to the Supreme Court, 30 DUQ. L. REV. 257, 260 (1992) (“Although the Supreme Court 
has consistently refused to limit the RICO dragnet, numerous lower federal courts have pinched and 
pruned the statute consistently. Paradoxically, many of the restrictive interpretations are based on the 
language of Section 1964(c), which creates a private right of action.”); David Kurzweil, Criminal and 
Civil RICO: Traditional Canons of Statutory Interpretation and the Liberal Construction Clause, 30 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 41, 72 (1996) (citation omitted) (“Despite the Sedima Court’s 
endorsement of civil RICO’s broad scope and its liberal interpretation of Section 1964(c), ‘judicial 
efforts to narrow (its) scope continue largely unabated.’”); Craig W. Palm, RICO and the Liberal 
Construction Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 167, 168–69 (1980) (“Most courts have followed the 
directive and interpreted RICO broadly. Some commentators and courts, however, have advocated a 
narrow construction, asserting that the statute is ambiguous and spreads the criminal net too wide.”). 
 19. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 491 n.10 (1985) (“Indeed, if Congress’ 
liberal-construction mandate is to be applied anywhere, it is in § 1964, where RICO’s remedial 
purposes are most evident.”). 
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one of the four racketeering acts described in § 1962.20 The four prohibited 
acts under RICO are: investment of racketeering income, acquiring or 
maintaining an interest in or control of an enterprise, conducting or 
participating in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise, and conspiring 
to violate any of these three prohibited activities.21  
RICO also requires the presence of an “enterprise” and a “pattern of 
racketeering activity”22 before any violation can be found.23 The term 
“pattern of racketeering activity” is defined as “at least two acts of 
racketeering activity . . . the last of which occurred within ten years . . . 
after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity.”24 The term 
“enterprise” is defined broadly as “any individual, partnership, 
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of 
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.”25 There is no 
 
 
 20. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). In an effort to limit the broad application of RICO, many courts 
began to create (somewhat artificial) requirements that are not expressly contained in the language of 
the statute. Many of these limitations involved special injury requirements. These courts  
attempted to limit civil RICO in six main ways: (1) by including an organized crime 
requirement, (2) by requiring proof of a competitive injury, (3) by requiring proof of a 
racketeering injury, (4) by requiring a prior criminal conviction, (5) by requiring that the 
enterprise be a legitimate business, or (6) by requiring that the enterprise be accompanied by 
an economic motive.  
See Audra K. Hamilton, RICO, the Unexpected Protector Unveiled in National Organization For 
Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 48 ARK. L. REV. 851, 865 (1995). The Supreme Court has rejected all of 
these limitations in turn.  
 21. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2000). 
 22. The issues raised by RICO’s requirement of a “pattern of racketeering activity” are quite 
numerous. For a discussion of some of these issues and a glimpse at the circuit courts’ lack of 
uniformity, see H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989). 
 23. For an excellent overview of the entire RICO statutory scheme see 1 KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, 
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY § 7 (2d ed. 1992). 
 24. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). One key element in the “pattern of racketeering activity” of RICO is 
continuity. The alleged pattern of activity must pose a continuing threat in order to violate RICO. 
Courts generally recognize two ways to satisfy the continuity requirement: open-ended continuity and 
closed-ended continuity. Criminal activity that is ongoing or likely to occur in the future constitutes 
“open-ended continuity.” Criminal activity that occurred over a substantial period of time—usually 
longer than one year—but has ceased may constitute “closed-ended” continuity and can also satisfy 
the pattern requirement. See BRICKEY, supra note 23, at 330–37. Another key element in the pattern 
requirement is the existence of a relationship between the separate racketeering acts. The relationship 
element requires the racketeering acts to have the same or similar purposes or results. The acts cannot 
merely be isolated events. Id. at 334. 
 25. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). RICO encompasses two general types of enterprises—formal 
organizations and “associated in fact” enterprises. Both legal entities and associations with strictly 
illegal motives are included in the definition. See BRICKEY, supra note 23, at 297–303. The enterprise 
element of RICO, similar to the pattern of racketeering activity and the injury requirements, has been 
used by courts to limit the reach of the statute. See, e.g., Paul Edgar Harold, Quo Vadis, Association in 
Fact? The Growing Disparity Between how Federal Courts Interpret RICO’s Enterprise Provision in 
Criminal and Civil Cases, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 781, 781–82 (2005) (“Since the inception of 
RICO, [courts] have especially attempted to curtail the reach of the ‘association-in-fact enterprise,’ the 
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requirement under the statute that there be a connection to organized 
crime. Therefore, legitimate businesses and individuals are subject to 
liability if they violate any of RICO’s provisions.26 The remedies available 
under RICO’s civil provisions are broad. Furthermore, the court possesses 
inherent equitable powers it may exercise to ensure justice. 
The Supreme Court has characterized disgorgement as an equitable 
remedy that is restitutionary in nature.27 In general, disgorgement is used 
to restore the status quo by forcing the defendant to return what rightfully 
belongs to the plaintiff or to return the fruits of his ill-gotten gains.28 The 
measure of an equitable remedy like disgorgement is the loss to the victim 
or the gain to the violator.29 Disgorgement can be seen as serving three 
general functions.30 First, it serves to end the violation.31 Second, 
disgorgement deprives the violator of the benefits of his violation.32 Third, 
it restricts or removes the power of the violator to carry on illegal activities 
in the future.33 Disgorgement is often used as a remedy in the context of 
securities law violations and other federal statutes.34 
 
 
element of the enterprise concept that gives RICO such variety in application. Currently, federal courts 
evidence the judicial hostility to civil RICO in particular through tightening their interpretation of what 
constitutes an association-in-fact enterprise in the civil context . . . .”). 
 26. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) (“Yet Congress wanted to 
reach both ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ enterprises. The former enjoy neither an inherent incapacity 
for criminal activity nor immunity from its consequences. The fact that § 1964(c) is used against 
respected businesses allegedly engaged in a pattern of specifically identified criminal conduct is hardly 
a sufficient reason for assuming that the provision is being misconstrued.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 27. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters, & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 570 (1990) 
(“First, we have characterized damages as equitable where they are restitutionary, such as in ‘action[s] 
for disgorgement of improper profits.’”) (internal citation omitted). 
 28. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424 (1987) (stating that restitution is limited to 
restoring the status quo and forcing the return of that which rightfully belongs to the plaintiff). 
 29. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES §§ 1.1, 4.1 (2d ed. 1993). 
 30. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 365 (1961) (“Divestiture 
or dissolution must take account of the present and future conditions in the particular industry as well 
as past violations. It serves several functions: (1) It puts an end to the combination or conspiracy when 
that is itself the violation. (2) It deprives the antitrust defendants of the benefits of their conspiracy. (3) 
It is designed to break up or render impotent the monopoly power which violates the Act . . . .”) 
(quoting Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 128–29 (1948), overruled on 
other grounds by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984)). See also 
United States v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 96 F. Supp. 356, 357 (1951) (“In general the object of the 
remedies under the anti-trust laws is to prevent the continuance of wrongful conduct, and to deprive 
the wrongdoers of the fruits of their unlawful conduct, and to prevent the creation anew of restraint 
forbidden by law.”). 
 31. E.I. du Pont, 366 U.S. at 365. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See United States v. Lane Labs-USA Inc., 427 F.3d 219 (3d. Cir. 2005) (listing several cases 
that have permitted or awarded disgorgement under several different federal statutes such as Federal 
Trade Commission Act, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Commodity Exchange Act). 
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A. Leading Cases 
The concept of disgorgement does not appear anywhere in the RICO 
statute. Interestingly, there have been relatively few cases addressing the 
issue of disgorgement as a remedy under civil RICO.35 The first case to 
consider the issue was United States v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family 
of La Cosa Nostra.36 In Bonanno, the district court reasoned that under 
securities laws, “[t]he authority to order disgorgement derives from the 
broad equitable powers given courts . . . .”37 In the context of civil RICO, 
the court explained that disgorgement should be available because the 
equitable powers granted to courts are broader than those available under 
securities laws.38 The court described the essence of equity jurisdiction as 
“the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the 
necessities of the particular case.”39 The ability of courts to be flexible in 
crafting a solution is what distinguishes equitable remedies from legal 
remedies.40 Ultimately, the court dismissed the government’s complaint 
and disgorgement was not ordered.41 
It was not long before the Eastern District of New York had another 
opportunity to consider the issue of disgorgement under civil RICO. In 
United States v. Private Sanitation Industry Association,42 the district 
court followed the Bonanno logic and allowed the government to pursue 
disgorgement as an appropriate equitable remedy under civil RICO.43 The 
court noted that divestiture was not the only remedy available under 
 
 
 35. See infra note 45. 
 36. 683 F. Supp. 1411 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) 
 37. Id. at 1448. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329–30 (1944)). 
 40. Id. See also Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 487 (1992) (“The essence of a court’s equity 
power lies in its inherent capacity to adjust remedies in a feasible and practical way to eliminate the 
conditions or redress the injuries caused by unlawful action. Equitable remedies must be flexible if 
these underlying principles are to be enforced with fairness and precision.”); United States v. Paradise, 
480 U.S. 149, 183–84 (1987) (“Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district 
court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in 
equitable remedies.”) (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971)); 
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 358 n.8 (1961) (“Equitable remedies 
. . . are distinguished by their flexibility, their unlimited variety, their adaptability to circumstances, 
and the natural rules which govern their use. There is in fact no limit to their variety and application; 
the court of equity has the power of devising its remedy and shaping it so as to fit the changing 
circumstances of every case and the complex relations of all the parties.”) (quoting POMEROY, EQUITY 
JURISPRUDENCE § 109 (5th ed. 1941)). 
 41. Bonanno, 683 F. Supp. at 1460. 
 42. 793 F. Supp. 1114 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 43. Id. at 1152. 
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§ 1964(a) and that disgorgement was among the equitable remedies 
available to courts.44 
1. United States v. Carson 
The Second Circuit, one of the few circuits to have actually decided the 
issue,45 ultimately agreed with the district court. In United States v. 
Carson,46 the Second Circuit held that disgorgement is an available 
remedy under RICO because of the broad equitable powers granted to 
courts under § 1964(a).47 Defendant Donald Carson was the Secretary-
Treasurer of the International Longshoremen’s Association from 1972 to 
1988.48 During his tenure, Carson was involved with the Gambino 
organized crime family.49 The district court found that Carson had 
accepted kickbacks in exchange for certain labor deals,50 embezzled funds 
from the Longshoremen’s Association,51 and had used intimidation and 
fear to suppress the democratic rights of union members by calling 
attention to his connection with organized crime.52 The district court 
ordered Carson to disgorge $60,000 in connection with his embezzlement 
of the Association’s funds.53 
According to the Second Circuit, “[a]s a general rule, disgorgement is 
among the equitable powers available to the district court . . . .”54 Even 
though the court accepted disgorgement as an available remedy under civil 
RICO, it limited use of disgorgement as a remedy to those situations in 
which disgorgement could be used to prevent “ongoing and future 
misconduct.”55 The court focused on the “to prevent and restrain” 
language of § 1964(a). “The three examples contained in the text of 
section 1964(a) are forward looking, and calculated to prevent RICO 
 
 
 44. Id. at 1151. 
 45. At the present time, only the Second and D.C. Circuits have actually decided the issue. 
However, the Fifth Circuit has discussed the issue in dicta. See United States v. Carson, 52 F.3d 1173 
(2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Richard v. 
Hoechst Celanese Chem. Group, Inc., 355 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 46. 52 F.3d 1173 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 47. Id. at 1181. 
 48. Id. at 1176. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 1177. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 1178. 
 53. Id. at 1179. 
 54. Id. at 1181. 
 55. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss4/4











violations in the future.”56 The court rejected the notion that whatever 
hurts a RICO violator will necessarily prevent and restrain future 
violations of RICO.57 Thus, under Carson, a court should order 
disgorgement if future violations would be impacted but should not order 
disgorgement merely as a means of punishing the RICO violator. Any 
punitive use of disgorgement is not authorized by § 1964 and therefore 
would fall outside the jurisdiction of the courts.58 
2. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. 
The D.C. Circuit is the only other circuit to have decided the issue of 
whether disgorgement is a proper remedy under civil RICO.59 The D.C. 
Circuit recently considered the issue of disgorgement in the context of the 
tobacco industry litigation.60 In United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.,61 
the government alleged that several cigarette manufacturers fraudulently 
concealed the fact that tobacco use poses certain health-related dangers to 
users, including cancer and other negative effects.62 The government also 
alleged that the cigarette manufacturers engaged in illegal marketing of 
their products to minors.63 The manufacturers engaged in a criminal 
enterprise to carry out their fraudulent activities and therefore violated 
RICO.64 The government sought several remedies including damages, 
injunctive relief, and disgorgement of $280 billion in proceeds from 
cigarette sales to the “youth addicted population” between 1971 and 
2001.65 The defendants challenged the availability of disgorgement as a 
remedy under civil RICO. 
 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 1182. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See supra note 45. 
 60. See Richard C. Ausness, Public Tort Litigation: Public Benefit or Public Nuisance?, 77 
TEMP. L. REV. 825, 863–69 (2004), for a brief discussion of the government’s suit against the tobacco 
industry. For a more extensive discussion see also Margaret A. Little, A Most Dangerous Indiscretion: 
The Legal, Economic, and Political Legacy of the Governments’ Tobacco Litigation, 33 CONN. L. 
REV. 1143 (2001); Robert L. Rabin, The Tobacco Litigation: A Tenative Assessment, 51 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 331 (2001). 
 61. 396 F.3d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied 126 S. Ct. 478 (2005). 
 62. Id. at 1192. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 1193. 
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Reversing the decision of the district court,66 the appellate court held 
“that the language of § 1964(a) and the comprehensive remedial scheme of 
RICO preclude disgorgement as a possible remedy . . . .”67 The appellate 
court viewed the language of § 1964(a), “to prevent and restrain” RICO 
violations, coupled with the examples of remedies given in the text,68 as 
limiting relief available under civil RICO exclusively to those remedies 
that are aimed at future actions.69 “Disgorgement, on the other hand, is a 
quintessentially backward-looking remedy focused on remedying the 
effects of past conduct to restore the status quo.”70 The court asserted a 
number of arguments to justify its holding. The court found the 
comprehensive structure of RICO’s remedial scheme to be strong evidence 
that Congress did not intend to authorize any remedies not expressly 
included in the statute.71 Because of RICO’s “‘comprehensive and 
reticulated’ remedial scheme,” there exists “a necessary and inescapable 
inference” that Congress intended to limit relief under § 1964(a) to 
exclude disgorgement.72 Additionally, the court noted the similarity 
between disgorgement under § 1964 and the criminal forfeiture provision 
of § 1963.73 However, because § 1963 is a criminal provision, it contains 
additional procedural safeguards such as a five-year statute of limitations, 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and certain notice requirements.74 If 
disgorgement was available as a remedy, plaintiffs could simply bypass 
the more rigorous procedures required by § 1963. Furthermore, recovery 




 66. See United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 72 (D.D.C. 2004). The district 
court went so far as to say that Carson’s limitation on disgorgement to those ill-gotten gains being 
used to fund illegal activities was not consistent with the plain language of § 1964(a) or the legislative 
history of RICO. Id. at 77. 
 67. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1197.  
 68. Section 1964(a) gives several examples of “appropriate orders”: 
[O]rdering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; 
imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person, 
including, but not limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of 
endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign 
commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making due provision 
for the rights of innocent persons. 
 69. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1198. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 1200. 
 72. Id. (citation omitted). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 1200–01. 
 75. Id. at 1201. See supra note 11 for damages available under § 1964(c). 
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In its opinion, the Philip Morris court relied on the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc.76 In Meghrig, the Court found that 
compensation for past environmental cleanup was not contemplated by the 
statute at issue.77 Meghrig arose in the context of a private citizen suit 
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)78 for 
recovery of cleanup costs incurred by the plaintiffs. The RCRA had a 
companion act in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),79 which provided for 
recovery of cleanup costs.80 Like § 1964(a), the RCRA also contains the 
language “to restrain” in its provision for remedies.81 The Court explained 
that “where Congress has provided ‘elaborate enforcement provisions’ for 
remedying the violation of a federal statute . . . ‘it cannot be assumed that 
Congress intended to authorize by implication additional judicial remedies 
for private citizens suing under’ the statute.”82 
The Philip Morris court rejected the government’s argument that 
Porter v. Warner Holding Co.83 and Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, 
Inc.84 require grants of equitable jurisdiction to be read broadly.85 In 
Porter, the Supreme Court concluded that the Emergency Price Control 
Act of 194286 authorized the courts to order recovery and restitution of 
illegal rents obtained in violation of the Act.87 The Court instructed, 
“Unless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable 
 
 
 76. 516 U.S. 479 (1996). 
 77. Id. at 483. 
 78. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (2000). The relevant portion provides: 
The district court shall have jurisdiction . . . to restrain any person who has contributed or 
who is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or 
disposal of any solid or hazardous waste referred to in paragraph (1)(B), to order such person 
to take such other action as may be necessary, or both . . . . 
 79. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 9675 (2000). 
 80. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1422 (8th Cir. 1990), 
abrogated on other grounds by Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809 (1994) (The “two . . . 
main purposes of CERCLA [are] prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites and imposition of all 
cleanup costs on the responsible party.”). 
 81. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 82. Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 487–88 (quoting Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea 
Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 14 (1981)). 
 83. 328 U.S. 395 (1946). 
 84. 361 U.S. 288 (1960). 
 85. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1197–99. 
 86. 50 U.S.C. App. § 925(a) (repealed 1947). The Emergency Price Control Act was enacted in 
response to substantial inflationary pressures in the United States and its imminent entrance into the 
Second World War. Congress was very concerned about rising prices, the cost of the war, and supply 
shortages owing to the country’s reduced labor force brought on by the large number of employed men 
and women who left their jobs and families to fight in the war. See S. REP. NO. 77-931 (1942). 
 87. Porter, 328 U.S. at 399. 
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inference, restricts the court’s jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that 
jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied.”88 Furthermore, “the 
comprehensiveness of this equitable jurisdiction is not to be denied or 
limited in the absence of a clear and valid legislative command.”89 The 
Court clearly stated that equity jurisdiction should not be limited once it is 
granted to the courts unless the language of the particular statute expressly 
places limits on the courts’ equitable powers.90 
In Mitchell, the Supreme Court followed the general principles laid out 
in Porter. Mitchell involved the equitable jurisdiction of courts under the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).91 The FLSA, similar to RICO, 
contained language that authorized courts “to restrain violations” of the 
Act.92 After quoting Porter’s general recognition of courts’ broad 
equitable powers, the Court went on to say: 
When Congress entrusts to an equity court the enforcement of 
prohibitions contained in a regulatory enactment, it must be taken to 
have acted cognizant of the historic power of equity to provide 
complete relief in light of the statutory purposes. As this Court long 
ago recognized, ‘there is inherent in the Courts of Equity a 
jurisdiction to . . . give effect to the policy of the legislature.’’93 
The Court found that the district courts’ equitable powers under the FLSA 
included the power to order reimbursement of lost wages because of an 
unlawful discharge.94 
The Philip Morris court distinguished the grant of equitable 
jurisdiction found in civil RICO from that found in the Emergency Price 
Control Act of 1942 and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.95 The goal 
 
 
 88. Id. at 398. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. 29 U.S.C. § 500 201-219 (2000). 
 92. 29 U.S.C. § 217 provides: 
The district courts, together with the United States District Court for the District of the Canal 
Zone, the District Court of the Virgin Islands, and the District Court of Guam shall have 
jurisdiction, for cause shown, to restrain violations of section 215 of this title, including in the 
case of violations of section 215(a)(2) of this title the restraint of any withholding of payment 
of minimum wages or overtime compensation found by the court to be due to employees 
under this chapter (except sums which employees are barred from recovering, at the time of 
the commencement of the action to restrain the violations, by virtue of the provisions of 
section 255 of this title). 
 93. Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 298, 291–92 (1960) (quoting Clark v. 
Smith, 38 U.S. 195, 203 (1839)). 
 94. Id. at 296. 
 95. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The court 
emphasized the fact that the statute at issue in Porter was designed to combat inflation. See supra note 
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of § 1964(a) is to prevent or restrain future violations.96 The court believed 
the plain language of the civil RICO provision limited the courts’ 
equitable jurisdiction to those remedies aimed solely at future conduct.97 
Thus, in the D.C. Circuit’s view, disgorgement is not an appropriate 
remedy under civil RICO.98 
3. Richard v. Hoechst Celanese Chemical Group, Inc. 
In contrast to the D.C. Circuit, the Fifth Circuit has spoken favorably 
about the Carson decision, but only in dicta. In Richard v. Hoechst 
Celanese Chemical Group, Inc.,99 the plaintiff brought a class action suit 
alleging that the defendants had misrepresented the quality of their 
polybutylene plumbing systems.100 The plaintiff claimed that the 
defendants had described their plumbing systems as lightweight, 
inexpensive, able to withstand harsh temperatures, and having a lifetime of 
fifty years.101 In reality, the defendants’ plumbing system did not live up 
to these promises.102 Among other claims, the plaintiff sought equitable 
relief under civil RICO.103 The Fifth Circuit declined to reach the question 
of whether disgorgement is available as an equitable remedy under civil 
RICO.104 Nonetheless, the court, in dicta, agreed with the reasoning of the 
Second Circuit in Carson.105 Disgorgement is available as a remedy under 
§ 1964(a) but “only to prevent ongoing and future conduct.”106 The 
 
 
86. The court reasoned that disgorgement of past overcharges would further the purpose of that 
particular statute. The purpose of § 1964(a), however, is to “prevent and restrain” violations in the 
future. According to the court, disgorgement would not further that purpose because its aim is to 
remedy past violations. Phillip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1198. 
 96. Phillip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1198. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Judge Tatel dissented. He disagreed with the majority’s application of Meghrig, arguing that 
Porter and Mitchell controlled the case. He did not interpret RICO’s provisions as imposing a 
“necessary and inescapable inference” limiting the district court’s equity jurisdiction, which prevents 
the complete administration of justice. Judge Tatel also disagreed with the majority’s view that 
disgorgement “is a quintessentially backward-looking remedy.” On the contrary, the decisions in 
Porter and Mitchell found that disgorgement can impact future conduct. Id. at 1220–24 (Tatel, J., 
dissenting). “Although I agree that a court sitting in equity cannot order disgorgement that exceeds a 
defendant’s past ill-gotten profits . . . this does not mean disgorgement is always backward-looking 
and can never have a forward-looking effect on the defendants. The Supreme Court made this clear in 
Porter . . . .” Id. at 1223. 
 99. 355 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 100. Id. at 347. 
 101. Id. at 348. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 349. 
 104. Id. at 354. 
 105. Id. at 355. 
 106. Id. 
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plaintiff in this case did not seek disgorgement to prevent and restrain the 
production of the plumbing systems. Indeed, the defendant manufacturers 
no longer produced the plumbing systems at all.107 In this instance, the 
disgorgement claim was sought as compensation for the injury to the 
plaintiff and not to prevent future conduct.108 
B. Legislative History 
A review of RICO’s legislative history reveals that Congress never 
specifically considered the issue of disgorgement as a remedy under 
§ 1964(a). Even so, the legislative history is valuable as a means for 
understanding what Congress intended to remedy by enacting RICO.109 
Prior to RICO’s enactment, Congress had documented extensively the 
pervasiveness, structure, and magnitude of organized crime, not only in 
illegitimate businesses, but also in legitimate businesses.110 In response to 
 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. Circuit Judge Wiener disagreed with the majority opinion on only one point—the 
availability of disgorgement to the plaintiff in Richard. He argued that the proper focus or target of the 
“prevent and restrain” language of § 1964(a) is not the specific defendant in the case, but is all 
potential defendants similar to the actual defendant. From this point of view, disgorgement would 
satisfy the “prevent and restrain” requirement by deterring potential violators from engaging in 
conduct prohibited by RICO. Id. at 355–56 (Wiener, J., dissenting) (“Thus, it seems clear to me that 
the primary thrust of disgorgement is to ‘prevent and restrain’ the offending parties—as well as all 
potential malefactors who receive the message—from engaging in such activities with any product, not 
just the single discontinued product that happened to have been the object of the proscribed behavior 
alleged in the particular case.”). 
 109. For a detailed overview of the legislative history of RICO, see G. Robert Blakey & Brian 
Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and 
Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009 (1980). See also Douglas E. Abrams, Crime Legislation and the 
Public Interest: Lessons from Civil RICO, 50 SMU L. REV. 33, 38–51 (1996). 
 110. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 89-72 (1965); S. REP. NO. 87-1784 (1962); S. REP. NO. 86-621 (1959); 
PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADM. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A 
FREE SOCIETY 190 (1967). In the Senate’s report accompanying the bill that would eventually be 
enacted as RICO, the Judiciary Committee listed its findings as follows: 
The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, 
diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America’s 
economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption; (2) 
organized crime derives a major portion of its power through money obtained from such 
illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the 
importation and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of social 
exploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt 
legitimate business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes; (4) 
organized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the Nation’s economic 
system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with free competition, 
seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten domestic security, and undermine 
the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens; and (5) organized crime continues to grow 
because of defects in the evidence-gathering process of the law inhibiting the development of 
the legally admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to 
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the growing problem of organized crime in America, Senators McClellan 
and Hruska each introduced a bill in the Senate aimed at combating 
organized crime.111 These two bills eventually were combined, and the 
new bill, named Senate Bill 30, was passed by the Senate almost 
unanimously.112 The House made several changes to Senate Bill 30. Most 
of the changes limited the scope of the bill.113 However, § 1964(c), 
providing for the additional remedies of treble damages and attorney’s 
fees, was added.114 The altered version of Senate Bill 30 passed in the 
House was approved by the Senate and signed into law by President Nixon 
on October 15, 1970.115 
Probably most illustrative of congressional intent in including § 1964 is 
the Senate’s report on the bill that eventually became RICO.116 In 
describing the civil remedies the bill provided, the Senate Judiciary 
Committee explained that, even though the use of remedies such as 
injunctions, divestment, and dissolution were explicitly authorized by the 
plain language of the statute, those remedies were not exclusive.117 The 
 
 
bear on the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions 
and remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact. 
S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 1–2 (1969). 
 111. Senator McClellan’s bill was titled the Organized Crime Control Act. S. 30, 91st Cong. 
(1969). Senator Hruska’s bill was titled the Criminal Activities Profits Act. S. 1623, 91st Cong. 
(1969). See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 109, at 1017. 
 112. The bill emerging from the Judiciary Committee and passed by the Senate was broader than 
either of the bills initially introduced by Senators McClellan or Hruska. See Blakey & Gettings, supra 
note 109, at 1019. Interestingly, the vote in the Senate to pass the bill was 73 to 1. 116 CONG. REC. 972 
(1970). 
 113. See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 109, at 1020. 
 114. There was little discussion regarding the private treble damages provision. It seemed to be 
generally accepted as a positive addition to the bill. See Kristi Rae Culver, Civil RICO: Should Private 
Plaintiffs be Granted Equitable Relief?, 18 PAC. L.J. 1199, 1211 (1986). The addition of subsection C 
to § 1964 was proposed by the American Bar Association. “In the portion seeking to add a proposed 
section 1964 ‘civil remedies’ we would recommend an amendment to include the additional civil 
remedy of authorizing private damage suits based on the concept of § 4 of the Clayton Act.” 116 
CONG. REC. 25, 190–91 (1970). 
 115. 116 CONG. REC. 37264 (1970). 
 116. See S. REP. NO. 91-617 (1969). 
 117. Id. at 81. Specifically, the Senate report reads: 
Title IX thus brings to bear on the infiltration of organized crime into legitimate business or 
other organizations the full panoply of civil remedies, including a civil investigative demand, 
now available in the antitrust area. The use of such remedies as prohibitory injunctions and 
the issuing of orders of divestment or dissolution is explicitly authorized. Nevertheless, it 
must be emphasized that these remedies are not exclusive, and that Title IX seeks essentially 
an economic, not a punitive goal. However remedies may be fashioned, it is necessary to free 
the channels of commerce from predatory activities, but there is no intent to visit punishment 
on any individual; the purpose is civil. Punishment as such is limited to the criminal remedies, 
noted above. 
Id. at 81. 
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purpose of § 1964 was to provide civil remedies in addition to the criminal 
penalties of § 1963 in order to give RICO more flexibility in addressing 
criminal organizations.118 Along with greater flexibility, civil remedies 
increase the deterrent effect of the statute and, in some cases, provide a 
more efficient method of attacking illegal activity (e.g. the standard of 
proof in civil cases is lower than in criminal cases). It is clear from the 
Senate’s report that the civil remedies provided for by RICO are meant to 
be strictly remedial in nature and are not intended to punish the violator. 
Punishment, as such, is limited to the criminal penalties laid out in 
§ 1963.119 
III. ANALYSIS 
Any discussion of the interpretation of civil RICO must be undertaken 
with the realization that the Supreme Court requires courts to read civil 
RICO broadly to effectuate its purpose.120 RICO’s liberal construction 
clause has been recognized and used by courts to broadly interpret RICO’s 
provisions.121 The legislative history of RICO confirms Congress’s intent 
to construe the statute broadly, not narrowly.122 Despite the fact that 
RICO’s broad application is commonly used against legitimate businesses 
rather than organized crime, the Supreme Court has upheld a broad 
construction of the statute, stating that this particular defect “is inherent in 
the statute as written, and its correction must lie with Congress.”123 
A. RICO’s Liberal Construction Mandate 
The court’s opinion in Philip Morris largely ignores RICO’s liberal 
construction clause. Instead, the court focuses on the words “to prevent 
and restrain” in § 1964(a).124 The court held, “The language of the statute 
explicitly provides three alternative ways to deprive RICO defendants of 
 
 
 118. Id. The civil remedies provided for in § 1964(a) include equitable remedies, which are 
inherently more flexible than legal remedies. See supra note 40. 
 119. S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 81 (1969). 
 120. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497–98 (1985) (“RICO is to be read 
broadly. This is the lesson not only of Congress’ self-consciously expansive language and overall 
approach, but also of its express admonition that RICO is to ‘be liberally construed to effectuate its 
remedial purposes . . . .’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 121. See Palm, supra note 18, at 168. 
 122. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 123. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499. See also United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 589–91 (1981) 
(holding that RICO applies to both legitimate and illegitimate businesses and noting the broad purpose 
of Congress to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States). 
 124. See United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1198 (2005). 
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control over the enterprise and protect against future violations: 
divestment, injunction and dissolution. We need not twist the language to 
create a new remedy not contemplated by the statute.”125 But the D.C. 
Circuit’s analysis completely ignores the plain language of § 1964(a), 
which reads, “The district courts of the United States shall have 
jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this 
chapter by issuing appropriate orders, including, but not limited to the 
listed remedies.”126 The court’s analysis essentially ignores the “including, 
but not limited to” language; instead, the court argues that because the 
examples of appropriate remedies given in § 1964(a) are all forward 
looking, all possible remedies under § 1964(a) must be forward looking.127 
This analysis also ignores the legislative history of the provision,128 which 
clearly shows that Congress envisioned use of any remedy which advances 
the goals of the statute.129 Nowhere in the legislative history is there any 
indication that disgorgement is precluded as a remedy under civil RICO 
because it is not strictly “forward looking.”130 
B. Interpreting Porter and Mitchell 
The D.C. Circuit also improperly interpreted both Porter and Mitchell. 
In Porter, the Supreme Court held that the Emergency Price Control Act 
granted courts equitable jurisdiction to order restitution of illegal rents 
obtained in violation of the Act.131 The relevant language in Porter 
granted courts the authority to enter a “permanent or temporary injunction, 
restraining order, or other order . . . .”132 The statute said nothing about 
 
 
 125. Id. at 1201. 
 126. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 127. Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1198. 
 128. See S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 160 (1969) (“Subsection (a) contains broad remedial provisions 
for reform of corrupted organizations. Although certain remedies are set out, the list is not exhaustive, 
and the only limit on remedies is that they accomplish the aim set out of removing the corrupting 
influence and make due provision for the rights of innocent persons.”). 
 129. Id. 
 130. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. The argument that disgorgement is an inherently 
backward-looking remedy also ignores its deterrent effect on future violations. Several judges have 
argued that the deterrent effect of disgorgement is sufficiently forward-looking to satisfy the “to 
prevent and restrain” language of § 1964(a). See, e.g., supra notes 98 and 108. 
 131. See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398–99 (1946) (“It is readily apparent from 
the foregoing that a decree compelling one to disgorge profits, rents or property acquired in violation 
of the Emergency Price Control Act may properly be entered by a District Court once its equity 
jurisdiction has been invoked under § 205(a).”). 
 132. Id. at 397. According to the Porter court, § 205(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act read: 
Whenever in the judgment of the Administrator any person has engaged or is about to engage 
in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of any provision of 
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disgorgement, but the Court allowed the use of restitution as a remedy 
under the statute despite the lack of any language specifically authorizing 
it.133 
In Mitchell, the Court held that the Fair Labor Standards Act granted 
courts the power to order restitution for lost wages resulting from a 
violation of the Act.134 The language at issue in Mitchell gave courts 
jurisdiction “to restrain the violations.”135 Mitchell thus expanded the 
scope of Porter to give courts as much equitable jurisdiction as is 
necessary to further the policies and purposes of the empowering statute. 
The language of the statute at issue in Mitchell is similar to the language 
used in § 1964(a).136 Both statutes use the phrase “to restrain,” which 
implies, at the very least, that equitable powers similar to those found 
available in Mitchell must also be available under civil RICO. 
Porter and Mitchell together stand for the proposition that “a district 
court sitting in equity may order restitution unless there is a clear statutory 
limitation on the district court’s equitable jurisdiction and powers; and . . . 
restitution is permitted only where it furthers the purposes of the 
statute.”137 With respect to § 1964(a), disgorgement furthers the purpose 
of the provision by depriving the violator of his ill-gotten gains and 
deterring the defendant from engaging in similar conduct in the future. 
This is consistent with Congress’s intent that all remedies that further the 
broad aims of RICO should be available under § 1964(a).138 
C. Misplaced Reliance on Meghrig 
Moreover, the Philip Morris court’s reliance on Meghrig is misplaced. 
Meghrig arose in the context of a private citizen suit under RCRA for 
recovery of cleanup costs incurred by the plaintiffs.139 Unlike RICO, this 
statute has a companion act in the CERCLA, which provides for recovery 
 
 
section 4 of this Act, he may make application to the appropriate court for an order enjoining 
such acts or practices, or for an order enforcing compliance with such provision, and upon a 
showing by the Administrator that such person has engaged or is about to engage in any such 
acts or practices a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order shall 
be granted without bond. 
Porter, 328 U.S. at 397. 
 133. See Porter, 328 U.S. at 399. 
 134. Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 296 (1960). 
 135. 29 U.S.C. § 217 (2000). 
 136. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 217 (2000) with 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (2000). 
 137. United States v. Lane Labs-USA Inc., 427 F.3d 219, 225 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 138. See supra note 128. 
 139. See Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 481 (1996). 
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of cleanup costs.140 RICO’s own provisions set out comprehensive 
remedies to effectuate its purposes. In addition, RICO’s statutory scheme, 
with its broad remedial purpose and liberal construction clause, is easily 
distinguishable from RCRA.141 The general principles clearly expressed in 
Porter and Mitchell control the availability of disgorgement as an 
equitable remedy under civil RICO, not Meghrig.142 
D. Characteristics of Disgorgement 
The Phillip Morris court’s refusal to recognize disgorgement as an 
available remedy under the logic of Porter and Mitchell is inconsistent 
with a number of other appellate courts, which have recognized 
disgorgement as an equitable remedy under other statutory schemes. For 
example, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Federal Trade Commission Act 
(FTCA) gives courts the equitable power to order disgorgement.143 In an 
FTC case against a telemarketing company, the court relied on Porter to 
infer broad equitable jurisdiction from the statute at issue.144 The FTCA 
granted courts the power to issue injunctions and “to enjoin” violations.145 
The court noted that the statute played an important role in the 
enforcement of consumer protection laws.146 “Accordingly, disgorgement, 
the purpose of which ‘is not to compensate the victims of fraud, but to 
deprive the wrongdoer of his ill-gotten gain,’ is appropriate.”147 
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit held that the Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act (FDCA) authorizes courts to compel disgorgement and 
restitution.148 In United States v. Universal Management Services, a case 
against a company engaged in the sale of certain products in violation of 
 
 
 140. Id. at 483. 
 141. See United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1220 (2005) (Tatel, J., 
dissenting) (“In my view, Porter and Mitchell, not Meghrig, ‘directly control’ this case. Several 
reasons support this conclusion, and nothing points the other way.”). 
 142. Id. 
 143. See FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 470 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 144. Id. at 469 (“As Porter makes plain, absent a clear command to the contrary, the district 
court’s equitable powers are extensive. Among the equitable powers of a court is the power to grant 
restitution and disgorgement.”). 
 145. See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), which provides in relevant part: “[T]he Commission by any of its 
attorneys designated by it for such purpose may bring suit in a district court of the United States to 
enjoin any such act or practice. . . . [I]n proper cases the Commission may seek, and after proper proof, 
the court may issue, a permanent injunction.” 
 146. FTC, 87 F.3d at 470. 
 147. Id. (quoting SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978)). 
 148. See United States v. Universal Mgmt. Services, Inc., 191 F.3d 750, 762 (6th Cir. 1999) 
(“[N]othing in the FDCA precludes a court sitting in equity from ordering restitution in appropriate 
cases.”). 
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the FDCA, the court also relied on Porter.149 The language of the FDCA 
grants courts jurisdiction “to restrain violations.”150 Therefore, the court 
held that because nothing in the FDCA explicitly restricted courts’ 
equitable jurisdiction, restitution and disgorgement were remedies 
available under the statute.151 
Even the D.C. Circuit has allowed disgorgement in the context of the 
Securities Exchange Act. In SEC v. First City Financial Corp.,152 the SEC 
charged the defendants with violating § 13(d) of the Securities Exchange 
Act.153 The court held that §§ 21(d) and (e)154 of the Act, which grant 
courts the power “to enjoin” future violations, permitted disgorgement as a 
remedy.155 Furthermore, the court described disgorgement as “an equitable 
remedy designed to deprive a wrongdoer of his unjust enrichment and to 
deter others from violating the securities laws.”156 The Philip Morris 
court’s characterization of disgorgement as an “inherently backward-
looking remedy” is in direct conflict with its previous holdings allowing 
disgorgement in other contexts because of the remedy’s tendency to deter 
future violations.157 
The critical difference between the Second Circuit’s view of 
disgorgement and the D.C. Circuit’s view lies in the courts’ views of how 
disgorgement functions as a remedy. Under the Second Circuit’s view, 
disgorgement can be an effective tool used to “prevent and restrain” future 
violations when the ill-gotten gains have been obtained relatively 
recently.158 On the other hand, the D.C. Circuit’s view of disgorgement is 
 
 
 149. Id. at 761 (“Absent a clear command by Congress that a statute providing for equitable relief 
excludes certain forms of such relief, this court will presume the full scope of equitable powers may be 
exercised by the courts.”). 
 150. 21 U.S.C. § 332(a) provides: “The district courts of the United States and the United States 
courts of the Territories shall have jurisdiction, for cause shown to restrain violations of section 331 of 
this title . . . .” 
 151. Universal Mgmt., 191 F.3d at 762. 
 152. 890 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 153. Id. at 1217. 
 154. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d), (e). 
 155. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d at 1230 (“Disgorgement, then, is available simply because the 
relevant provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, sections 21(d) and (e), 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78u(d) and (e), vest jurisdiction in the federal courts.”). 
 156. Id. (emphasis added). 
 157. Compare United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1198 (2005) 
(“Disgorgement, on the other hand, is a quintessentially backward-looking remedy focused on 
remedying the effects of past conduct to restore the status quo.”), with First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 
at 1230 (“Disgorgement is an equitable remedy designed to deprive a wrongdoer of his unjust 
enrichment and to deter others from violating the securities laws.”). 
 158. See supra text accompanying notes 54–57. 
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that the remedy is inherently backward looking and cannot be used to 
prevent future violations.159 
The D.C. Circuit’s characterization of disgorgement is erroneous. Not 
only does the court’s depiction of disgorgement as inherently backward 
looking ignore the Supreme Court’s discussion of restitution in Porter, it 
also ignores the economic and deterrent effects of the remedy. In Porter, 
the Court characterized orders for restitution as having a material impact 
on the likelihood of future violations.160 The Court explained that “it is not 
unreasonable for a court to conclude that such a restitution order is 
appropriate and necessary to enforce compliance with the Act and to give 
effect to its purposes. Future compliance may be more definitely assured if 
one is compelled to restore one’s illegal gains . . . .”161 Moreover, the 
government presented expert testimony in the Philip Morris case showing 
that a disgorgement order will have a substantial deterrent effect on future 
violations.162 For example, one of the government’s expert witnesses 
testified that “requiring defendants to pay proceeds will affect their 
expectations (and those of others contemplating malfeasance) about the 
returns from future misconduct. As a matter of economic principle, the 
higher the proceeds amount, the lower the expected returns from future 
misconduct and the greater the desired effect of deterrence.”163  
The Philip Morris court’s view of disgorgement as a remedy is limited 
and incomplete. The court focuses on the fact that past ill-gotten gains are 
taken from the violator while ignoring all other benefits of the remedy 
such as deterrence and prevention of the funds being used in future 
violations. Disgorgement is not merely a “backward-looking” remedy. On 
the contrary, disgorgement has real value in preventing and deterring 
future violations.164 
IV. PROPOSAL 
The Supreme Court should resolve the circuit split by allowing 
disgorgement as a remedy under § 1964(a). The court in Philip Morris 
 
 
 159. See supra notes 66–75 and accompanying text. 
 160. Porter v. Warner Holdings Co., 328 U.S. 395, 400 (1946). 
 161. Id. 
 162. See Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1223 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (“The government offers expert 
testimony to the effect that a disgorgement order will deter the tobacco companies from violating 
RICO in the future—in the dictionary’s language, it will deprive them of the hope of succeeding in 
benefiting from future RICO violations and hold them back from committing such violations.”). 
 163. Id. at 1206 (citation omitted). 
 164. See supra notes 160–62 and accompanying text. 
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incorrectly applied the general principles set out in Porter and Mitchell 
that “[u]nless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and 
inescapable inference, restricts the court’s jurisdiction in equity, the full 
scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied.”165 Furthermore, 
the Carson court’s admonition that “we do not see how it serves any civil 
RICO purpose to order disgorgement of gains ill-gotten long ago.”166 also 
misses the mark. Both courts failed to recognize, or even consider, the 
possibility that disgorgement can act as a deterrent function that serves to 
“prevent and restrain” future violations.167 The Supreme Court explicitly 
recognized the restraining effect of restitution in Porter.168 Both Carson 
and Philip Morris ignore the import of Porter’s general principles. 
Disgorgement also serves to “prevent and restrain” future violations by 
depriving the violator of capital used “to fund or promote the illegal 
conduct.”169 In this respect, the effect of disgorgement is similar to the 
effects of divestment or dissolution, which are expressly listed in 
§ 1964(a).170 In fact, in circumstances where the defendants are legitimate 
businesses, such as large publicly held corporations like the one in Philip 
Morris, disgorgement is a much more attractive equitable remedy than 
either divestment or dissolution because the defendant company can 
continue to do business after disgorging its ill-gotten gains. One of the 
principle characteristics of equitable jurisdiction is the power of the court 
to craft flexible remedies that best address the problems in a given case.171 
The argument that disgorgement overlaps with the criminal remedy of 
forfeiture, which is available under § 1963(a), is without merit. Congress 
never intended for RICO’s civil and criminal remedies to be mutually 
exclusive.172 Rather, Congress intended to provide new remedies, both 
criminal and civil, in order to supply the option to the government of using 
whatever tool would be most effective.173 The legislative history is quite 
clear on this point.174 
 
 
 165. Porter, 328 U.S. at 398. 
 166. United States v. Carson, 52 F.3d 1173, 1182 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 167. See Philip Morris, 396 F.3d at 1223 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (“This court does not conclude that 
disgorgement can never have a restraining effect on future conduct of the defendants—the only 
conclusion that could justify a holding that district courts can never order disgorgement under section 
1964(a). Instead, the court offers several unpersuasive reasons for its conclusion that as a matter of 
statutory interpretation disgorgement is not a permissible remedy under section 1964(a).”). 
 168. Porter, 328 U.S. at 400. See also supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
 169. Carson, 52 F.3d at 1182. 
 170. See supra note 14. 
 171. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 172. See S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 79 (1969) (observing that an individual violator could be legally 
separated from the organization either by the criminal law approach or through a civil law approach). 
 173. Id. at 78 (noting that traditional criminal approaches were relatively ineffective tools for 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss4/4











Finally, the legislative history of RICO demonstrates that Congress 
intended to grant courts broad equitable powers.175 Section 1964(a) brings 
to bear on RICO violators “the full panoply of civil remedies.”176 
Although certain specific remedies are laid out in § 1964(a), the legislative 
history of the section shows that “the list is not exhaustive, and the only 
limit on remedies is that they accomplish the aim set out of removing the 
corrupting influence and make due provision for the rights of innocent 
persons.”177 Disgorgement properly advances the aims of civil RICO by 
preventing and restraining future violations. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Disgorgement is a restitutionary remedy that should be available to 
courts hearing RICO claims under the equitable jurisdiction granted by 
§ 1964(a). The two appellate courts that have decided this issue have split. 
In Carson, the Second Circuit held that disgorgement is an available 
remedy under § 1964 because of the broad equitable powers granted to 
courts by that provision. However, the Carson court limited the use of 
disgorgement as a remedy to those situations in which it could be used to 
prevent ongoing and future conduct. In Philip Morris, the D.C. Circuit 
held that the language of § 1964(a) and the comprehensive remedial 
scheme of RICO preclude disgorgement as a proper remedy. 
The Philip Morris court largely ignored the legislative history of 
RICO, which demonstrates that the equitable remedies expressly listed in 
§ 1964(a) are not exhaustive. The remedies listed within the statute are 
examples of the remedies available under § 1964(a), but are by no means 
meant to be a limitation on other equitable remedies which are not 
expressly listed in the provision. 
Furthermore, the Philip Morris decision incorrectly interpreted 
Supreme Court precedent. Both Porter and Mitchell clearly stand for the 
proposition that a court’s equitable jurisdiction, including restitution, may 
not be limited absent clear statutory intent to do so. The language “to 
 
 
implementing RICO’s economic policy). Congress sought new remedies to deal not only with 
individual criminals but also with the economic base those individuals used to carry out their crimes. 
Id. at 79 (“What is needed here, the committee believes, are new approaches that will deal not only 
with individuals, but also with the economic base through which those individuals constitute such a 
serious threat to the economic well-being of the Nation. In short, an attack must be made on their 
source of economic power itself, and the attack must take place on all available fronts.”). 
 174. See supra notes 117–19 and accompanying text. 
 175. See supra notes 116–19 and accompanying text. 
 176. S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 81 (1969). 
 177. Id. at 160 (emphasis added). 
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prevent and restrain” in § 1964(a) certainly does not constitute a clear 
statutory intent to limit the equitable jurisdiction of courts. This is 
especially true given the clear intent of Congress that the only limit on 
RICO’s civil remedies be that “they accomplish the aim set out of 
removing the corrupting influence and make due provision for the rights of 
innocent persons.”178 Thus, the equitable remedies available under 
§ 1964(a) should be interpreted broadly in order to accomplish the goals of 
RICO.179 
Finally, excluding disgorgement as an available remedy under civil 
RICO is inconsistent with many other appellate court decisions that have 
recognized disgorgement as a proper equitable remedy under other similar 
statutory schemes. Many other courts have interpreted statutory language 
similar to the “prevent and restrain” language used in § 1964(a). These 
other courts reasoned that disgorgement often furthers the purpose of a 
particular statute by depriving the wrongdoer of his ill-gotten gains and 
deterring others from committing similar violations in the future.  
For the reasons discussed above, Philip Morris unnecessarily restricts 
the equitable jurisdiction conveyed by § 1964(a) and should not be 
followed by other courts. Disgorgement should be a remedy available to 
courts under § 1964(a) to further the goals Congress sought to achieve 
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 179. See supra note 1 listing the major goals sought by RICO. 
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